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INTRODUCTION 
 
Can a compensation consultant provide objective advice to the 
board regarding executives’ pay packages when the same consultant 
provides other services to the company?  Can investors understand how 
executives are compensated if companies do not disclose the level of 
performance that the company must achieve for executives to obtain 
certain amounts of compensation?  Is the disclosure about executive 
compensation complete, absent full information regarding earnings on 
deferred compensation and perquisites?1  This Article concludes that the 
answer to these three questions is a resounding no.2  Although the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgated new 
executive compensation disclosure rules that governed the 2007 proxy 
season,3 the foregoing issues were not adequately addressed by the new 
rules. 
For example, when the board of the North Fork Bancorporation 
(“North Fork”) hired Mercer Human Resources Consulting for 
compensation advice, Mercer suggested a golden parachute that would 
pay the top three executives $288 million if the company underwent a 
change in control.4  This package included a tax gross-up on restricted 
stock to the chief executive officer (“CEO”) of $44 million.5  One pay 
 1. See infra Part IV. 
 2. See infra Part V. 
 3. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act 
Release No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54302A, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732afr.pdf [hereinafter Adopting Release]. 
 4. Jesse Drucker & James Bandler, North Fork Executives to Receive $288 
Million for Capital One Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2006, at A1.  “[A] golden 
parachute [is a] lucrative contract given to a top executive to provide lavish benefits in 
case the company is taken over by another firm, resulting in the loss of the job.  A 
golden parachute might include generous severance pay, stock options, or a bonus.” 
JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT TERMS (7th ed. 2006). 
 5. See Gretchen Morgenson, Bank Deal’s Payout Plan Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2006, at C1.  A tax gross-up is an executive compensation tool that enables a 
company to cover the taxes on an executive’s perks and benefits. Drucker & Bandler, 
supra note 4.  In other words, “a tax buy-off is known as a ‘gross-up’ because 
beneficiaries receive ‘gross’ pretax sums rather than net post-tax sums.” Daniel Gross, 
Gross-Up? Gross Out.  The Latest Abomination in CEO Pay, SLATE, Mar. 15, 2006, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2138119/?nav=tap3.  Restricted stock may be defined as 
follows: “Insider holdings that are under some other kind of sales restriction.  Restricted 
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expert concluded that the CEO could potentially receive tax gross-up 
payments worth nearly $111 million.6  Essentially, the corporation 
would pay the taxes for a CEO taking home about $185 million.7  This 
pay package raises a red flag: it is unusual for a company to pay the 
taxes on restricted stock upon a change in control.8  However, Mercer 
recommended this uncommon compensation package in a situation 
where it performed other services for the bank.9  In fact, Mercer earned 
nearly $1 million in 2002 and 2003 for its services as actuary to North 
Fork’s cash-balance retirement plan.10
North Fork’s payment to Mercer for these services certainly raises 
doubts as to whether Mercer provided objective advice to the board and 
highlights an area of disclosure that the new rules fail to address.  In 
fact, this compensation package exemplifies the reality of the new rules.  
While the amendments are an overall improvement to the previous 
regime, they do not result in complete disclosure. 
Part I of this Article describes the history of executive 
compensation and the disclosure of this compensation.  Part II discusses 
problems with incomplete disclosure.  Part III discusses the amendments 
to the executive compensation disclosure rules.  Part IV discusses the 
four areas in which the rules fall short: a lack of information regarding 
compensation consultants, a lack of disclosure of target performance 
levels, a lack of disclosure of earnings on deferred compensation, and a 
lack of disclosure of perquisites.  Part V proposes solutions for more 
effective executive compensation disclosure.  Part VI concludes this 
Article. 
 
stock must be traded in compliance with special SEC regulations.  Insiders are given 
restricted stock after merger and acquisition activity . . . .” Definition of Restricted 
Stock, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/restrictedstock.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 
2007). 
 6. See Drucker & Bandler, supra note 4. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Morgenson, supra note 5. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
2008 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE RULES 63 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  History Of Executive Compensation
Executive compensation is a relatively new area of study.11 In fact, 
such compensation did not exist prior to the development of the modern 
corporation.12  This form of business organization started with New 
Jersey legislation in 1896, and by 1901 the first major corporation was 
organized.13  When corporations first formed and developed, they were 
led by entrepreneurs, exemplified by men like Henry Ford.14  By the 
middle of the twentieth century, however, a new class of business actor 
evolved to run corporate America.15  These individuals did not found 
companies, but rather made up an elite class of executives who held 
powerful positions in major corporations.16
Even though a corporation must disclose the pay for its top five 
executives,17 the study of executive compensation typically focuses on 
the pay received by the CEO.18  The CEO typically receives the highest 
pay of any person in the corporation, and this amount of compensation 
has increased over time.19 By the 1950s, some CEOs were making 
relatively large salaries, but many salaries were not exorbitant.20  As of 
1960, the average CEO at a large corporation earned around $190,000,21 
equivalent to approximately $1.3 million today.22  CEO pay rose quickly 
 11. James A. Cotton, Toward Fairness in Compensation of Management and 
Labor: Compensation Ratios, A Proposal for Disclosure, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 157, 
158-62 (1997). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of 
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1993). 
 14. Id. at 9. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(3) (2007). 
 18. See generally LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) 
(addressing the topic of executive compensation by solely analyzing the pay of CEOs). 
 19. Id. at 1. 
 20. See Bogus, supra note 13, at 10. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INFLATION 
CALCULATOR, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sept. 9, 2007) (follow 
“About this calculator” hyperlink). 
The CPI inflation calculator uses the average Consumer Price Index for a given 
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during the 1960s and then slowed during the 1970s.23  Between 1980 
and 1993, executive compensation increased dramatically.24
From 1993 to 2000, the amount of executive compensation 
increased sharply.25  In large companies, such as those representing the 
S&P 500, average CEO pay increased from $3.7 million in 1993 to 
$17.4 million in 2000.26  Unsurprisingly, the aggregate pay of the top 
five executives increased from $9.5 million to $36.6 million in this time 
period.27  There were similar trends in both the mid-cap and small-cap 
firms for both CEO pay and the pay of the top five executives.28  
Executive compensation peaked in 2000 and decreased during 2001, due 
mainly to the poor performance of the stock market.29  Executive 
compensation levels, however, have been on the rise since 2001.30  In 
fact, CEO pay increased 6% in 2006.31
calendar year.  This data represents changes in prices of all goods and services 
purchased for consumption by urban households.  This index value has been 
calculated every year since 1913.  For the current year, the latest monthly index value 
is used. 
Id. 
 23. See Bogus, supra note 13, at 10. 
 24. Id.  For example, during the 1980s CEO compensation rose by 212% in real 
terms. Id. 
 25. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay 2 (The 
Harv. John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 510, 2005), available at http:// 
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_et%20al_510.pdf 
(relying on compensation information from the standard ExecuComp database, which 
“includes all the S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400 and Small-Cap 600 companies).  “Together, 
these firms constitute more than 80% of the total market capitalization of U.S. public 
firms.” Id.  “Mid cap stocks typically have between $1 billion and $5 billion in 
outstanding market value” while “[s]mall cap stocks usually have a market 
capitalization of $500 million or less.” Downes & Goodman, supra note 4, at 421, 655. 
 26. Bebchuk & Grinstrein, supra note 25, at 3.  This jump in pay represents an 
increase of 370% in real terms. 
 27. Id.  This jump in pay represents an increase of 285% in real terms. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Boss’s Pay: The WSJ / Mercer 2002 CEO Compensation Survey, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 14, 2003, at R6.
 30. See id; see also CEO Compensation Survey (A Special Report) – The Boss’s 
Pay: The WSJ / Mercer 2005 CEO Compensation Survey, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, 
at R7.
 31. Press Release, Equilar Inc., Equilar Study Finds S&P 500 CEO Pay Up 6.0 
Percent to $8.5 Million (Apr. 12, 2007), available at http://www.equilar.com/newslet 
ter/april_2007/2007_04_ect_pv.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2007). 
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B.  History of Executive Compensation Disclosure 
Before there were specific disclosure rules for executive 
compensation, requirements for disclosure were in Schedule A to the 
Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and Section 12(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).32  Both acts list the 
types of information that must be disclosed in registration statements.33  
After observing that executive compensation needed more specific 
attention, the SEC enacted its first executive compensation disclosure 
rules for proxy statements in 1938.34  Since then, the Commission’s 
rules require companies to provide a narrative explanation of the levels 
of compensation, provide these levels of compensation in tabular form, 
or provide both types of disclosure.35  For example, the Commission 
introduced the first tabular disclosure of executive compensation in 
1942.36  Ten years later, it introduced a separate table for pensions and 
deferred compensation, and in 1978, the SEC expanded tabular 
disclosure to cover all forms of executive pay.37  Owing to the fact that 
the 1978 rules were overly complex, too detailed, and resulted in too 
many interpretive issues, the SEC issued new rules in 1983.38  While the 
 32. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,160 n.44. 
 33. Id. 
Item 14 of Schedule A called for disclosure of the “remuneration, paid or estimated to 
be paid, by the issuer or its predecessor, directly or indirectly, during the past year and 
ensuing year to (a) the directors or persons performing similar functions, and (b) its 
officers and other persons, naming them wherever such remuneration exceeded 
$25,000 during any such year.”  Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act as enacted 
required disclosure of “(D) the directors, officers, and underwriters, and each security 
holder of record holding more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security 
of the issuer (other than an exempted security), their remuneration and their interests 
in the securities of, and their material contracts with, the issuer and any person 
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by, or under direct or indirect common 
control with, the issuer;” and “(E) remuneration to others than directors and officers 
exceeding $20,000 per annum.” 
Id. 
 34. Id. at 53,160 n.45. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Disclosure of Executive Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 6486, 
Exchange Act Release No. 20,220, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,529, 48 
Fed. Reg. 44,467 (Sept. 29, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Release]. 
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1983 rules mandated some tabular disclosure, they primarily required 
narrative disclosure.39
After analyzing the effectiveness of limited tabular disclosure, the 
Commission adopted amendments to the executive compensation rules 
in 1992.40  These amendments abandoned the primarily narrative 
disclosure approach for a highly formatted tabular one to facilitate the 
comparison of annual compensation among companies.41  Because of 
the complexity of compensation programs, however, the Commission 
observed that the rigidity of the 1992 rules did not result in complete 
disclosure.42
In August 2006, after determining that the 1992 rules required 
significant changes, the SEC amended the executive compensation 
disclosure rules.43  The new rules build on the 1992 amendments by 
providing broader tabular disclosure while simultaneously improving 
narrative disclosure.44  Consequently, the amended rules most 
comprehensively govern executive compensation relative to previous 
regimes.45  Yet despite their improvement, the new rules do not result in 
complete disclosure.46
II.  PROBLEMS WITH INCOMPLETE DISCLOSURE 
There are two main problems with incomplete disclosure of 
executive compensation.  First, shareholders cannot adequately 
influence the board of directors’ decisions regarding executive pay 
without complete disclosure of such compensation.47  Second, when 
shareholders, business media, social groups and professional groups do 
 39. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,160; see generally 1983 Release, supra 
note 38. 
 40. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,161. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 53,160. 
 44. See id. (explaining that “[t]his approach will promote clarity and completeness 
of numerical information through an improved tabular presentation, continue to provide 
the ability to make comparisons using tables, and call for material qualitative 
information regarding the manner and context in which compensation is awarded and 
earned”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See infra Part IV. 
 47. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 51-52 (arguing that shareholders’ 
resolutions can influence executive pay practices). 
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not know the full measure of compensation paid to executives, there is a 
risk that executives and board members will be affected by so-called 
“outrage costs.”48
A.  Inability of Shareholders to Influence Board 
Complete disclosure of the entire amount of executive 
compensation informs both institutional and private shareholders about 
the actual levels of executive pay.49  When this information is properly 
disseminated, shareholders can undertake two major actions to influence 
the amount of compensation paid to executives: place proposals directly 
on proxy statements pursuant to Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act50 
and/or launch “vote no” or “withhold the vote” campaigns. 
1.  Shareholder Proposals 
The form and substance of shareholder proposals changed over 
time.  While precatory resolutions on executive compensation were 
historically supported by social or labor activists and disfavored by 
institutional investors, the data from proxy resolutions show that in 
recent years, executive pay has become increasingly important to all 
shareholders.51  In 2004, there were twenty-three shareholder proposals 
regarding pay for performance and in 2007 there were over sixty.52  The 
percentage of shareholders who voted for these proposals increased from 
19.2% to 35.1% during this period.53  Shareholders regarded executive 
pay as the most important issue during the 2006 proxy season,54 and a  
 
 48. Id. at 64-66.  Outrage costs refer to negative reactions by outsiders regarding 
high levels of executive compensation. Id. at 65. 
 49. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,159 (stating that the new rules will 
provide investors with a more complete picture of the compensation earned by a 
company’s executives). 
 50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2007). 
 51. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 52.  Precatory resolutions are not 
binding on the board even though they are supported by a majority of shareholders. Id. 
 52. See 2006 Postseason Report: Spotlight on Executive Pay and Board 
Accountability, 2006 Institutional Shareholder Services 3 [hereinafter Postseason 
Report]; Posting of L. Reed Walton to Risk & Governance Blog, 
http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2007/07/preliminary_postseason_reports.html (July 13, 
2007) [hereinafter Walton Blog]. 
 53. See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 4; Walton Blog, supra note 52. 
 54. See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 2. 
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preliminary review of the 2007 proxy season shows this trend is 
continuing.55
Two of the most popular shareholder proposals during the 2006 and 
2007 proxy seasons were “pay for performance” and “say on pay” 
resolutions.56  Pay for performance resolutions base a CEO’s pay 
relative to his or her company’s total shareholder return.57  Say on pay 
proposals give shareholders a non-binding advisory vote on executive 
compensation packages and first appeared on shareholders’ ballots in 
2006; by 2007 there were more than forty such proposals, and the 
percentage of shareholders who voted for these proposals increased from 
40% to 42.4% during this time period.58
Observing the popularity of say on pay resolutions, the U.S. House 
of Representatives passed a “say on pay bill” on April 20, 2007.59  This 
bill requires corporations to give shareholders the right to vote on 
executive pay packages without having to use shareholder proposals.60  
Boards can disregard the results of the votes, however, because they are 
still non-binding.61  It is worth mentioning that this bill tracks similar 
legislation in Britain and Australia, which mandates voting on say on 
pay and has fostered a cooperative dialogue among shareholders and 
boards about compensation.62
2.  Vote No Campaigns 
Shareholders can show their staunch disapproval of executive 
compensation packages by engaging in “vote no” or “withhold the vote” 
campaigns.  While shareholders cannot vote against a director who is 
running unopposed, they can withhold their vote from one or more 
 
 55. See Walton Blog, supra note 52. 
 56. See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 2; Walton Blog, supra note 52. 
 57. See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 15. 
 58. See Walton Blog, supra note 52. 
 59. See House Votes to Give Investors Say on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2007, at C4.  The bill was drafted by Representative Barney Frank, a Democrat from 
Massachusetts and the chairman of the Financial Services Committee.  It passed by a 
269-134 vote. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Gretchen Morgenson, Roadblocks To Greater Say on Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2007, § 3, at 1. 
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directors up for election.63  Although directors only need a plurality of 
votes to get elected, a substantial “withheld vote” in a director election 
demonstrates sharp shareholder criticism of executive pay packages.64
In 2006, investors withheld support for compensation committee 
members at many large companies, including Pfizer.65  While the AFL-
CIO and the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds chastised the 
$83 million retirement package for CEO Henry McKinnell, an investor 
group organized a “vote no” campaign against two Pfizer compensation 
committee board members.66  Both members received a 21% withhold 
vote.67  Similarly, ten of eleven directors at Home Depot received 
withhold votes ranging from 30% to 36% in 2006.68  Home Depot 
investors were enraged that the company’s CEO had earned $200 
million in compensation between 2001 and 2005 while the company’s 
stock price dropped 13%.69  The staggering number of shareholder 
protests through withhold votes should cause boards to reevaluate the 
amount of, and manner in which, executives receive compensation. 
B.  Lack of Social Accountability 
When shareholders, business media, social groups and professional 
groups know the amount of compensation paid to executives, the 
disapproval by these groups can result in “outrage costs.”70  There are 
three main ways in which this public outcry might influence both the 
levels of executive compensation and the policies by which executive 
compensation is determined: through the market for corporate control, 
the labor market, and the social network.71
 63. Diane Del Guercio, Laura Wallis & Tracie Woidtke, Do Boards Pay Attention 
when Institutional Investors ‘Just Vote No’?  CEO and Director Turnover Associated 
with Shareholder Activism 3 (U. of Tenn. Corp. Gov. Ctr., Working Paper, 2006), 
available at http://www.corpgovcenter.org/Research2006/DoBGueWalWoi2006.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Postseason Report, supra note 52, at 5.  Other companies include: 
UnitedHealth, Occidental Petroleum, Exxon Mobil, Clear Channel Communications, 
CA, and Home Depot. Id. at 5-6. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 6. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 18, at 64-66. 
 71. Id. 
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In the market for corporate control, investors could view excessive 
compensation as a sign of director and manager indifference to 
shareholder interests.72  As a result, shareholders will seek to divert 
power away from the board when presented with the opportunity to do 
so.73  For example, in a proxy fight or hostile takeover, these investors 
would probably not support the incumbents.74
The sanctioning of excessive executive compensation has the 
potential to give directors and managers negative reputations.75  This 
might affect future career prospects and lead to disapproval by social 
and professional groups.76  Consequently, this public embarrassment and 
criticism can affect both the levels of executive pay and the means by 
which it is awarded.77
While outrage costs are a powerful constraint on executive pay, 
they deliver little influence on the levels of compensation unless all 
observers are familiar with the amount of, and the way that, executive 
compensation is awarded.78  The new executive compensation disclosure 
rules now require disclosure of most of this information. 
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE NEW EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURE RULES 
After proposing amendments to the executive compensation 
disclosure rules79 and receiving 28,828 comments in response,80 the 
SEC adopted amendments to the disclosure requirements for executive 
compensation and other corporate governance matters.81  The new rules 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 8655, Exchange Act Release No. 3185, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27,218, 71 Fed. Reg. 6542 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rul 
es/proposed/33-8655fr.pdf [hereinafter Proposing Release]. 
 80. Comments on Proposed Rule: Executive Compensation and Related Party 
Disclosure, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306.shtml. 
 81. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,158.  In addition to amending the 
rules for executive compensation and certain corporate governance matters, the SEC 
also amended the requirements for disclosure of related party transactions and board 
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were designed to provide investors with a clearer and more complete 
picture of executive compensation.82  The rules require increased 
discussion of a company’s use of compensation consultants.83  
Moreover, the compensation committee of the board of directors must 
furnish a report stating that it reviewed and discussed the Compensation 
Discussion and Analysis section (“CD&A”) with management.84  The 
CD&A is a narrative description of a company’s data regarding 
compensation policies and procedures reflected in the tables.85  The SEC 
underscores that the Summary Compensation Table, however, remains 
the principal disclosure vehicle for executive compensation.86
A.  Corporate Governance Disclosures 
The SEC currently mandates more thorough disclosure regarding 
compensation consultants than it had in previous years.87  This 
information is not required in the CD&A, but instead must be disclosed 
in the corporate governance section, which focuses on the resources 
utilized by the compensation committee in setting the amount of 
executive pay.88  Each company must disclose the following: state any 
role of compensation consultants in determining the amount of 
compensation; identify such consultants; state whether such consultants 
are engaged directly by the compensation committee; describe the nature 
and scope of their assignment; and list the material elements of the 
instructions or directions given to the consultants with respect to the 
performance of their duties under the engagement.89  Despite the breadth 
of this disclosure, it is still incomplete—the company is not required to 
disclose whether the compensation consultant performs other consulting 
services for management.90
compensation. Id.  However, this article is solely focused on the amendments to the 
executive compensation rules and certain corporate governance matters. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 53,205. 
 84. Id. at 53,168. 
 85. Id. at 53,160. 
 86. Id. at 53,169.  This table shows compensation with respect to the last three 
fiscal years and discloses a single figure for total compensation. Id. 
 87. Id. at 53,205. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(e)(3)(iii) (2007). 
 90. See Letter from James F. Reda, Managing Dir., James F. Reda & Assocs., LLC, 
to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Apr. 6, 2006), available at 
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B.  Compensation Committee Report 
Under the new rules, a company’s compensation committee must 
furnish a Compensation Committee Report.91  This report is similar to 
the Audit Committee Report currently required in proxy statements.92  
In this section, the compensation committee needs to state that it 
discussed the CD&A with management, and that based on this review 
and discussion, it recommended to the board of directors the inclusion of 
the CD&A in the proxy statement.93  Like the Audit Committee Report, 
the name of each member of the compensation committee has to appear 
below the disclosure.94  Yet, unlike the Audit Committee Report, which 
has a separate section describing whether auditors are independent of 
management,95 the Compensation Committee Report contains no 
separate section requiring disclosure of whether compensation 
consultants are independent of management.96  Because compensation 
consultants might have conflicts of interest, the absence of such 
disclosure makes the new rules incomplete.97
C.  Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
The CD&A is a narrative overview which provides information 
about the company’s compensation objectives, policies, procedures, and 
processes.98  This section is designed to put into narrative context the 
disclosure provided elsewhere in the filing.99  The CD&A is considered 
part of the proxy statement and any other filing that includes it.100  The 
SEC deems the CD&A “soliciting material” that must be filed with the 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jfreda3948.pdf [hereinafter Reda Comment 
Letter]. 
 91. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,168. 
 92. Id. at 53,168. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101(9)(e)(1) (2007). 
 96. See Reda Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 3-4. 
 97. Id. at 4-5. 
 98. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,164. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 53,167. 
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Commission and therefore is subject to Regulation 14A or 14C and the 
liabilities of section 18 of the Exchange Act.101
The CD&A ought to explain the following: the objectives of the 
compensation program; what the compensation program is designed to 
reward; each element of compensation; why the company chooses to pay 
each element; how the company determines the amount for each 
element; and how each element fits into the company’s overall 
compensation objectives.102  To offer guidance to companies, the SEC 
lists several examples of the topics that might need to be disclosed in 
this section.103  Since the rule requires disclosure of all material 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 53,164. 
 103. Id. at 53,165.  Examples of such information include: (i) The policies for 
allocating between long-term and currently paid out compensation; (ii) The policies for 
allocating between cash and non-cash compensation, and among different forms of non-
cash compensation; (iii) For long-term compensation, the basis for allocating 
compensation to each different form of award (such as relationship of the award to the 
achievement of the registrant’s long-term goals, management’s exposure to downside 
equity performance risk, correlation between cost to registrant and expected benefits to 
the registrant); (iv) How the determination is made as to when awards are granted, 
including awards of equity-based compensation such as options; (v) What specific items 
of corporate performance are taken into account in setting compensation policies and 
making compensation decisions; (vi) How specific forms of compensation are 
structured and implemented to reflect these items of the registrant’s performance, 
including whether discretion can be or has been exercised (either to award 
compensation absent attainment of the relevant performance goal(s) or to reduce or 
increase the size of any award or payout), identifying any particular exercise of 
discretion, and stating whether it applied to one or more specified named executive 
officers or to all compensation subject to the relevant performance goal(s); (vii) How 
specific forms of compensation are structured and implemented to reflect the named 
executive officer’s individual  performance and/or individual contribution to these items 
of the registrant’s performance, describing the elements of individual performance 
and/or contribution that are taken into account; (viii) Registrant policies and decisions 
regarding the adjustment or recovery of awards or payments if the relevant registrant 
performance measures upon which they are based are restated or otherwise adjusted in a 
manner that would reduce the size of an award or payment; (ix) The factors considered 
in decisions to increase or decrease compensation materially; (x) How compensation or 
amounts realizable from prior compensation are considered in setting other elements of 
compensation (e.g., how gains from prior option or stock awards are considered in 
setting retirement benefits); (xi) With respect to any contract, agreement, plan or 
arrangement, whether written or unwritten, that provides for payment(s) at, following, 
or in connection with any termination or change-in-control, the basis for selecting 
particular events as triggering payment (e.g., the rationale for providing a single trigger 
for payment in the event of a change-in-control); (xii) The impact of the accounting and 
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information, however, a company can neither rely solely on disclosing 
information that relates to these examples nor use mere boilerplate 
disclosure.104  A company must disclose all information that is material 
to its compensation objectives and policies, unless a specific exemption 
applies, such as the exemption for target performance levels.105  This 
safe harbor for performance targets makes the new disclosure rules 
incomplete.106
D.  Summary Compensation Table 
The purpose of the Summary Compensation Table is to provide 
investors with a simplified and more comprehendible picture of total 
compensation and the various elements that comprise it.107  This table is 
the primary disclosure vehicle for executive pay and was designed to 
capture all forms of executive compensation.108  The Summary 
Compensation Table requires that a company disclose all executive 
compensation with respect to the last three fiscal years.109  The portion 
of the Summary Compensation Table requiring monetary disclosure is 
reproduced below:110
 
Salary 
(c) 
Bonus 
(d) 
Stock 
Awards 
(e) 
Option 
Awards 
(f) 
Non-equity 
Incentive Plan 
Compensation 
(g) 
Change In Pension 
Value and Non-
qualified Deferred 
Compensation 
Earnings   (h) 
All Other 
Compen-
sation 
(i) 
Total 
Compen-
sation 
(j)  
 
tax treatments of the particular form of compensation; (xiii) The registrant’s equity or 
other security ownership requirements or guidelines (specifying applicable amounts and 
forms of ownership), and any registrant policies regarding hedging the economic risk of 
such ownership; (xiv) Whether the registrant engaged in any benchmarking of total 
compensation, or any material element of compensation, identifying the benchmark 
and, if applicable, its components (including component companies); and (xv) The role 
of executive officers in determining executive compensation. Id. 
 104. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,164. 
 105. Id. at 53,166; see infra Part IV.B. 
 106. See Letter from Richard L. Trumka, Sec’y-Treasurer, AFL-CIO, to Nancy M. 
Morris, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Apr. 5, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/propo 
sed/s70306/aflcio040506.pdf [hereinafter Trumka Comment Letter]. 
 107. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,169. 
 108. Id. at 53,169. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 53,170. 
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The total compensation column (column (j)) is an innovative and 
crucial part of the new rules.111  Prior to the amendments, securities 
analysts and investors were unable to determine an accurate figure for 
total compensation.112  Moreover, they could not determine an amount 
of total compensation that was comparable across years for the same 
company or for the same year across different companies.113  The new 
total compensation column tries to solve these problems by attempting 
to capture all of the compensation earned by executive officers.114  It 
does so by aggregating in column (j) the total dollar value that is 
disclosed in columns (c) through (i).115  In light of the way in which 
nonqualified deferred compensation earnings column (h) and perquisites 
column (i) are disclosed, however, the total compensation column will 
be understated.116
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURE RULES 
The amended executive compensation disclosure rules do not result 
in complete disclosure because (1) information regarding the conflicts of 
interest of compensation consultants is lacking; (2) disclosure regarding 
performance target levels is lacking; (3) only above-market interest rate 
earnings on deferred compensation need be disclosed; and (4) only 
disclosure of perquisites exceeding $10,000 is required.117
A.  Compensation Consultants’ Conflicts of Interest 
The current relationship between compensation consultants and the 
compensation committee is similar to the relationship between auditors 
and the audit committee prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.118  Before Sarbanes-Oxley, the auditing firms of the late 1990s 
generated large percentages of their revenue by providing non-audit 
 111. Id. 
 112. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,170. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 53,174-76. 
 117. See infra Part IV.A-D. 
 118. See Reda Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 5. 
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consulting services to companies.119  As a result, auditors had an 
incentive to approve misleading accounting figures so that they could 
preserve and obtain more lucrative non-audit consulting contracts from 
management.120  To prevent this conflict of interest the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act limited the types of non-audit services that an accounting firm can 
provide to a company for which it performs an audit.121  In fact, the Act 
eliminated the economic incentives for the auditors to conform to 
management’s personal objectives during the audit.122  However, this 
economic incentive was not eliminated for compensation consultants 
who perform services for both the compensation committee and 
management.123
Like the auditing firms of the late 1990s, compensation consultants 
stand to profit more from the work performed for management than 
from the services provided to the compensation committee.124  This 
incentive is present because most human resources consulting firms are 
diversified.125  In fact, out of the largest consulting firms in the United 
States, just one company provides only compensation consulting 
services.126  Moreover, compensation consulting makes up a very small 
percentage of revenue for most diversified consulting firms.127  For 
example, at a typical diversified consulting firm, compensation 
consulting revenue will be between 0.5% and 2% of total firm 
revenue.128  Therefore, all other revenues come from non-executive 
compensation-related consulting services.129
As a result, the diversified consulting firm’s impartiality is 
compromised when it provides executive compensation advice to the 
board and is retained by management for other services. 130  Consultants 
presumably support management’s compensation decisions in order to 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1. 
 124. Id. at 5. 
 125. Id. at 6. 
 126. Id. at 5. 
 127. Id. at 7. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Letter from Peter C. Clapman, CEO, Governance for Owners USA Inc., to 
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Apr. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/pcclapman6514.pdf 
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preserve and obtain lucrative consulting contracts for matters other than 
executive compensation consulting.131  Thus, they are less likely to be 
independent in their advice to the compensation committee because they 
are under pressure to produce compensation packages that satisfy 
management.132
B.  Target Performance Levels 
Under the new rules, the SEC does not require companies to 
disclose performance target levels in the CD&A if such disclosure 
would result in competitive harm to the company.133  A performance 
target level is a quantitative or qualitative performance-related standard 
considered by the compensation committee of the board of directors that 
an executive must meet to obtain a certain level of compensation.134  
Pursuant to the amendments, companies are exempt from disclosing 
performance targets involving confidential trade secrets or confidential 
commercial or financial information if the disclosure would result in 
competitive harm.135
In order to satisfy this exemption, the company must demonstrate to 
the SEC that it has met the same standard for confidential treatment that 
is used when the Commission decides whether to grant a confidential 
treatment request.136  In effect, the rule maintains a safe harbor under 
which companies may exclude performance targets if the SEC finds that 
such disclosure would be competitively harmful to the company.137  
 131. See Reda Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 7. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,166. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 53,166-67. 
While the instruction adopted . . . does not require a company to seek confidential 
treatment under the procedures in Securities Act Rule 406 and Exchange Act Rule 
24b–2 with regard to the exclusion of the information from the disclosure provided in 
response to this item, the standards specified in Securities Act Rule 406, Exchange 
Act Rule 24b-2, Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act and Rule 80(b)(4) 
promulgated under the Freedom of Information Act still apply and are subject to 
review and comment by the staff of the Commission. 
Id. at 53,167 n.94. 
 137. Letter from Ann Yerger, Executive Dir., Council of Institutional Investors, to 
Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Mar. 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/s70306-74.pdf [hereinafter Yerger 
Comment Letter]. 
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Exempting performance targets from the CD&A impairs the quality of 
information disclosed, however, because it makes the link between 
executive pay and company performance difficult to assess.138
Pay for performance is probably the most important issue for 
shareholders regarding executive compensation.139  Yet, under the new 
rules, shareholders will not know the performance target levels that 
executives must meet to obtain a specified level of compensation.140  
Consequently, they cannot accurately determine whether executives are 
being paid for meeting these targets.141  Because companies do not have 
to disclose the levels of compensation that are tied to the targets, nor 
disclose whether such targets were met, the owners of the firm will not 
be informed as to how and why executives are compensated.142
Moreover, shareholders can best judge the effectiveness of their 
board if they have access to information about performance targets.143  
Therefore, disclosure would help make compensation committees more 
accountable should they decide to provide bonuses or incentive pay even 
when performance targets are not met.144  The exemption of 
performance targets is also unwarranted because shareholders, as the 
owners of the company, are entitled to know the levels of performance 
that must be achieved to earn the performance awards.145  By exempting 
companies from making this type of disclosure, the Commission 
perpetuates shareholder ignorance about significant portions of a firm’s 
compensation policies.146  This exception undermines the purpose of the 
new rules because it leaves out a vital element of the company’s 
compensation philosophy.147
 138. Id. 
 139. Trumka Comment Letter, supra note 106. 
 140. See Letter from the Honorable Barney Frank, Member, House Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC 2 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/bfrank041006.pdf [hereinafter Frank 
Comment Letter]. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Trumka Comment Letter, supra note 106. 
 146. See generally Trumka Comment Letter, supra note 106. 
 147. Id. 
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C.  Summary Compensation Table 
Under the new rules, the figure for total compensation will be 
understated for two reasons.  The first reason is that earnings on deferred 
compensation only have to be disclosed at above-market interest rates.148  
The other reason is that perquisites only have to be disclosed to the 
extent that they exceed $10,000.149  Because both of these figures are 
part of the total compensation column,150 the amount of total 
compensation will be understated.151  In the Summary Compensation 
Table, nonqualified earnings on deferred compensation are disclosed in 
column (h), perquisites in column (i), and total compensation in column 
(j).152  To highlight these portions of the Summary Compensation Table, 
the table is reproduced below:153
 
Salary 
(c) 
Bonus 
(d) 
Stock 
Awards 
(e) 
Option 
Awards 
(f) 
Non-equity 
Incentive 
Plan 
Compen-
sation 
(g) 
Change In Pension 
Value and Non-
qualified Deferred 
Compensation 
Earnings 
(h) 
All 
Other 
Compen-
sation 
(i) 
Total 
Compen-
sation 
(j)  
 
1.  Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Earnings 
Under the new rules, the disclosure of deferred compensation 
earnings is limited to the amount earned at above-market interest 
rates.154  The term “above-market interest” refers to interest earned in 
excess of 120% of the applicable federal long-term rate.155  As of 
September 2007, this above-market interest would include interest 
earned at a rate that exceeds 6.13%.156  This means that a company does 
 
 148. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,174. 
 149. Id. at 53,176. 
 150. Id. at 53,170. 
 151. Id. at 53,176. 
 152. Id. at 53,170. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 53,174. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Rev. Rul. 2007-57, 2007-36 I.R.B. 532, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-irbs/irb07-36.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2007). 
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not have to disclose earnings on deferred compensation that accrue at an 
interest rate below 6.13%.157
An analysis of the earnings on deferred compensation at Analog 
Devices, Inc. (“Analog”) provides an example of how disclosing 
earnings at above-market interest rates results in incomplete disclosure.  
At Analog, the company’s CEO withdrew a previously undisclosed 
$144.7 million from his deferred compensation account.158  Under the 
rules in effect when this 2006 proxy statement was filed, Analog was not 
obligated to disclose this amount to investors.159  Pursuant to the new 
rules, companies must disclose the amount of deferred compensation.160  
Yet, the rules only require disclosure of a portion of the interest earned 
on executives’ deferred compensation accounts.161  For example, had the 
new rules been in effect when Analog’s CEO earned $8.7 million in 
interest on the money in his deferred compensation account in 2005,162 
Analog would have been required to disclose only $1.2 million of this 
interest.163  As a result, total compensation would have been understated 
by $7.5 million.164  
2.  Perquisites 
Perquisites given to executives are disclosed in the All Other 
Compensation Column of the Summary Compensation Table (column 
(i)), and the dollar figure disclosed for these earnings is used to calculate 
the total amount of compensation.165  Companies must disclose perks 
 
 157. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,174. 
 158. See Gretchen Morgenson, A ‘Holy Cow’ Moment in Payland, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2006, § 3, at 1; Analog Devices, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 28 
(Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Analog Proxy]. 
 159. Morgenson, supra note 158. 
 160. Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,170. 
 161. Id. at 53,174. 
 162. See Analog Proxy, supra note 158, at 19. 
 163. Id. at 19 n.3.  “SEC regulations consider the ‘market rate’ to be 120% of the 
applicable federal long-term rate, or AFR.  Earnings credited to participants electing the 
fixed-rate investment option for fiscal year 2005 were calculated using an average 
interest rate of 6.48% and 120% of the average AFR was 5.57%.” Id.  With earnings of 
$8,743,912 at 6.48%, the total earnings on deferred compensation are $134,936,914, 
and the earnings on this total at 5.57% are $7,515,986.  The company is only obligated 
to disclose above-market earnings of $1,227,926. 
 164. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,176. 
2008 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE RULES 81 
 
unless the amount of such compensation is less than $10,000.166  
Although the amendments to the rules for disclosing perquisites are an 
improvement compared to the old regime, the exemption causes the total 
compensation figure to be understated.167
There are two reasons why all perquisites should be disclosed.168  
The first reason is that any substantial threshold, especially one as large 
as $10,000, provides a loophole for companies.169  Firms can simply 
disaggregate perquisite compensation to qualify for the exemption by 
breaking the perks down into increments that are less than $10,000.170  
For example, a firm could allocate $9,000 for football tickets, $9,000 for 
theatre tickets, and $9,000 for basketball tickets, and disclose none of 
this information in the Summary Compensation Table.171  Another 
permutation of this abuse could be as follows: a company could break 
down a car allowance into a car leasing allowance, a gas allowance, a 
car insurance allowance, and a travel allowance while not disclosing the 
total car allowance.172  It is easy to imagine that under the new rules a 
company could have $1,000,000 of perquisites broken down into 110 
separate items each worth roughly $9000, resulting in hundreds of 
thousands of dollars worth of perks remaining undisclosed.173
The second reason all perquisites should be disclosed is that certain 
perks might be a waste of corporate assets even absent a major impact 
on the total compensation column.174  For example, a company could 
provide lavish office extras such as daily flowers and gilded umbrella 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. (noting that the earlier rule permitted the omission of perquisites if the 
aggregate amount of such compensation was the lesser of either $50,000 or 10% of the 
total annual salary and bonus). 
 168. Letter from C. William Jones, President and Executive Dir., Ass’n of BellTel 
Retirees, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 4 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/cjones9947.pdf [hereinafter Jones Comment 
Letter]. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Letter from Kurt Schacht, CFA, Managing Dir., CFA Ctr. for Fin. Mkt. 
Integrity & James C. Allen, CFA, Senior Policy Analyst, CFA Ctr. for Fin. Mkt. 
Integrity, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 8 (Apr. 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/jcallen041306.pdf. 
 171. See Letter from Paul Hodgson, Senior Research Assoc., The Corporate Library, 
to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/ru 
les/proposed/s70306/phodgson032706.pdf [hereinafter Hodgson Comment Letter]. 
 172. Id. at 2. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Jones Comment Letter, supra note 171. 
82 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF  Vol. XIII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
stands.175  Regardless of the perquisite’s significance on the total 
compensation column, the very fact of such a perk could signal the 
existence of other problems with the company’s executive compensation 
policies.176
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS WITH THE NEW 
DISCLOSURE RULES 
The proposed solutions to the problems with the amended executive 
compensation disclosure rules are specifically designed to address the 
four problems with the rules.  First, the Commission should require 
disclosure of all work performed by compensation consultants by 
requiring companies to disclose all fees received by these consultants.177  
Second, the SEC must insist upon disclosure of target performance 
levels after the conclusion of the performance period.178  Third, the 
Commission needs to mandate disclosure of all earnings on deferred 
compensation and require disclosure of all perquisites.179
A.  Disclosure of All Work Performed by Compensation Consultants 
The Commission should require companies to disclose all of the 
work performed by compensation consultants, list the fees received for 
the work that is done, and state the nature of the work that is 
performed.180  To accomplish this goal, the SEC ought to amend section 
407(e) of Regulation S-K, and in so doing ask companies to provide a 
tabular disclosure of these fees.181  The table should include the type of 
work performed by the compensation consultant and the fees received 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Letter from Martha L. Carter, Senior Vice President and Managing Dir. of 
Corporate Governance, Institutional S’holder Servs., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 3 
(Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70306/mcarter9965. 
pdf. 
 177. See infra Part V.A. 
 178. See infra Part V.B. 
 179. See infra Part V.C. 
 180. Letter from Brian T. Foley, Managing Dir., Brian Foley & Co., Inc., to Nancy 
M. Morris, Sec’y, SEC 2-3 (Apr. 10, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro 
posed/s70306/btfoley4083.pdf. 
 181. See Reda Comment Letter, supra note 90, at 7 (suggesting similar disclosure 
but suggesting that such disclosure should be included in the CD&A rather than as an 
amendment to section 407(e)). 
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by the consultant for this work.182  To ensure a more comprehensive and 
textured response, however, the SEC cannot abandon narrative 
disclosure, and can ask companies to include such a description of the 
specific nature of the work performed in the footnotes to this table.183
This disclosure is appropriate because of the similarity between the 
current relationship among compensation consultants, management, and 
the compensation committee, and the relationship among auditors, 
management, and the audit committee prior to Sarbanes-Oxley.184  In 
fact, this recommended disclosure is similar to the disclosure required in 
the Audit Committee Report.185  Such disclosure is crucial to assure that 
auditors are truly independent of management.186  Thus, by requiring a 
table for compensation consultants similar to the one included in the 
Audit Committee Report for auditors, investors will be better able to see 
whether compensation consultants are independent of management,187 
thereby compelling the compensation committee to ensure that 
compensation consulting advice comes without coercive strings 
attached.188
To assure independence, the tabular disclosure required by the 
suggested amendments to section 407(e) of Regulation S-K should result 
in the following table:189
 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION CONSULTING FEES AND ALL OTHER FEES 
 2007 2006 
Executive Compensation 
Consulting Fees (a) 
$XXX $XXX 
All Other Fees (b) $XXX $XXX 
Total Fees (c) $XXX $XXX 
 
In this table, companies would have to disclose the following 
information: under the caption Executive Compensation Consulting 
Fees, the aggregate fees billed for each of the last two fiscal years for 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 3. 
 184. Id. at 5. 
 185. Id. at 7. 
 186. Id. at 5. 
 187. Id. at 7. 
 188. Id. at 7-8. 
 189. Id.  This table is similar, but not identical, to the table provided in the Reda 
Comment Letter. 
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executive compensation consulting services rendered by the principal 
compensation consultant (row (a)); for fees disclosed under this 
category, the company would have to describe the nature of the services 
comprising the fees; under the caption All Other Fees, the aggregate fees 
billed in each of the last two fiscal years for products and services 
provided by the principal compensation consultant, other than the 
services reported in (row (a)); for fees disclosed under this category, the 
company would have to describe the nature of the services comprising 
the fees; and under the caption total fees, the sum of the amounts 
reported in rows (a) and (b). 
B.  Disclosure of Target Performance Levels after the Conclusion 
of the Performance Period 
The SEC needs to mandate the disclosure of target performance 
levels after the conclusion of the performance period190 by amending 
Instruction 4 to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K to require disclosure after 
the performance related to the award is measured.191  This increased 
disclosure would result in investors being better able to assess the link 
between executive pay and company performance.192  While the 
disclosure of performance targets can result in competitive harm, the 
potential for this harm is mitigated if disclosure is required after the 
performance related to the award is measured.193  Because competitors 
would also be required to publish information about performance 
targets, the competitive costs to the companies should equalize once all 
the information is disclosed.194  In short, this disclosure will not result in 
competitive harm because companies and compensation consultants 
already have access to this information.195  Moreover, because 
performance targets are generally based upon public information such as 
the company stock price or disclosed financial statements, requiring 
disclosure of targets will not place an undue burden on companies.196  
Thus, the Commission should require companies to disclose this 
information to give investors a better understanding of a company’s 
 190. See Yerger Comment Letter, supra note 137. 
 191. Id. at 3. 
 192. See Frank Comment Letter, supra note 140. 
 193. See Adopting Release, supra note 3, at 53,166. 
 194. See Frank Comment Letter, supra note 140. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Trumka Comment Letter, supra note 106. 
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compensation policies, philosophies, and procedures.197  Requiring 
disclosure after the conclusion of the performance period is appropriate 
because it addresses companies’ competitive concerns while providing 
shareholders with important information about executive compensation 
practices.198
To strike the appropriate balance between the competitive concerns 
of companies and shareholders’ access to information, the SEC should 
require companies to disclose the performance measure, the 
performance target, the actual performance, whether or not the target 
was achieved, and the amount earned from the performance.  Amending 
Instruction 4 to Item 402(b) achieves the requisite balance among the 
interests of investors, the company, and the public.199  The 
corresponding table should appear as follows: 
 
Performance 
Measure 
Performance 
Target 
Actual 
Performance 
Achievement Amount Earned 
 
C.  Disclosure of All Earnings on Deferred Compensation 
and All Perquisites 
In its proposing release, the Commission recommended disclosure 
of all earnings on deferred compensation.200  The SEC should have 
implemented the rules as proposed.201  It should remedy this decision by 
amending Item 402(c)(2)(viii)(B) to require disclosure of all earnings on 
deferred compensation.  In addition, this Item should also require 
separate footnote identification if such earnings exceed $10,000.202  The 
Commission should also adopt Proposed Instruction 5 to Item 
402(c)(2)(ix), which permits a company to identify by footnote the 
portion of any earnings that it considered to be paid at an above-market 
 
 197. See Yerger Comment Letter, supra note 137, app. at 2. 
 198. See Frank Comment Letter, supra note 140. 
 199. Yerger Comment Letter, supra note 137, app. at 3. 
 200. Proposing Release, supra note 79, at 6552. 
 201. “Such compensation must include, but is not limited to . . . all earnings on 
compensation that is deferred on a basis that is not tax-qualified, including such 
earnings on non-qualified defined contribution plans.” Id. at 6612. 
 202. Id. at 6552. 
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interest rate.203  The current rule, by enabling companies to skirt 
disclosure of all earnings on deferred compensation, allows firms to 
avoid disclosure of substantial executive pay.204  This exemption also 
causes the total compensation figure to be understated.  Consequently, 
the Commission should adopt the recommended amendment because it 
strikes the appropriate equilibrium between disclosing earnings that a 
company believes to be above-market and capturing all of the 
compensation paid to executives. 
In addition to requiring disclosure of all earnings on deferred 
compensation, the SEC should require disclosure of all perquisites.  To 
accomplish this goal, the Commission needs to amend Item 
402(c)(2)(ix)(A) to eliminate the $10,000 threshold for the disclosure of 
perks.  Although the SEC acknowledges that the exclusion of perquisites 
results in an understated figure for total compensation, it justifies the 
$10,000 threshold because of the potential burden on companies to track 
every benefit, no matter how small.205  Yet, companies’ accounting 
departments already track this expense; therefore, most firms have this 
information readily available.206  Moreover, shareholders are entitled to 
know both the amount and types of perquisites to assess whether the 
board is wasting corporate assets.207  Consequently, the SEC ought to 
adopt the recommended amendment because it provides necessary 
information to shareholders and results in a more accurate figure for 
total compensation. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Although the amendments to the executive compensation disclosure 
rules are an improvement over the previous regime, the new rules do not 
result in complete disclosure.  Therefore, the Commission should require 
disclosure of all work performed by compensation consultants, all 
performance targets after the conclusion of the performance period, all 
earnings on deferred compensation, and all perquisites.  While the SEC 
should be commended for the new rules, an exhaustive review of the  
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2007 proxy season is likely to reveal some of the rules’ deficiencies.  
This article addressed some of these shortcomings, but further inquiry 
into the sufficiency of the new rules is warranted. 
 
